How Civil Wars End
- 1 December 1996
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 40 (4) , 546-568
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002796040004002
Abstract
What conditions determine whether a civil war ends in a negotiated settlement or a military victory? The authors address this question by developing an expected utility model of the choice between seeking an immediate settlement or continuing to fight in anticipation of eventual victory. The model implies that the likelihood of a settlement varies with estimates of the probability of winning, the time required to win, the rate at which the costs of conflict accrue, and the payoffs for victory versus settlement. Logistic regression results suggest that a settlement becomes less likely the larger the government's army and more likely the longer the civil war lasts. Payoff and cost variables had no effect on the likelihood of a settlement.Keywords
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