The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
Open Access
- 13 July 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 30 (4) , 581-601
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0256-x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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