New Tensions in Army-Party Relations in China (1965–1966)

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Abstract
In 1958, the Chinese Communist leadership agreed on a revised set of basic principles governing the relationship between the Party and the Army, These principles, which involved a move away from the professionalisation of the Army, became summarised in the slogans “politics in command” and “the Party commands the gun. The changes reflected a decision to continue to rely on a revolutionary strategy based on people's war despite the decision to devote substantial resources to nuclear weapons. After a bitter dispute between the Party and the Army, Mao decided to reject Khrushchev's proposals for a unified nuclear command and to rely on an expanded military force to deter an American attack. Moreover, the Party emphasised the need to put military units to work in the economy. It thus turned the Army away from increased professionalism and technical training towards organising the militia and participating in economic construction work. Like other salient features of the Maoist view revealed at that time the 1958 guide lines for Party-Army relations assumed that a satisfactory balance could be achieved between professional modernisation and the role of the expert, on the one hand, and political mobilisation or “revolutionisation” (ideological “redness”), on the other. It was the Army's resistance to these moves that led to the purge of major military leaders, including P'eng Teh-huai in 1959.

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