International Protection of Intellectual Property
Top Cited Papers
Open Access
- 1 December 2004
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 94 (5) , 1635-1653
- https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828043052312
Abstract
We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacity for innovation. After describing the determination of national patent policies in a noncooperative regime of patent protection, we ask, "Why is intellectual property better protected in the North than in the South?" We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Political Economy of Intellectual Property TreatiesJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2004
- The North’s intellectual property rights standard for the South?Journal of International Economics, 2002
- National patents, innovation and international agreementsThe Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 2002
- Reaping what you sow: an empirical analysis of international patent harmonizationJournal of International Economics, 2001
- Parallel ImportsThe World Economy, 2000
- Determinants of patent rights: A cross-national studyResearch Policy, 1997
- Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property RightsEconometrica, 1993
- Welfare Effects of Global Patent ProtectionEconomica, 1992