Takeovers, Freezeouts, and Risk Arbitrage
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic model of tender offers in which there is trading on the target's shares during the takeover, and bidders can freeze out target shaKeywords
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