Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
- 16 December 2002
- book chapter
- Published by Springer Nature
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
- Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determinationPublished by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) ,2002
- Linear Programming and Vickrey AuctionsPublished by Springer Nature ,2002
- Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctionsArtificial Intelligence, 2001
- Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctionsPublished by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,2001
- Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctionsPublished by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,2000
- Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithmsPublished by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,2000
- A k BAPublished by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,2000
- Computationally Manageable Combinational AuctionsManagement Science, 1998
- Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?Journal of Political Economy, 1990
- Multipart pricing of public goodsPublic Choice, 1971