Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party
- 1 November 1999
- proceedings article
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 120-127
- https://doi.org/10.1145/319709.319726
Abstract
We describe a novel and efficient protocol for the following problem: A wants to buy some good from B if the price is less than a. B would like to sell, but only for more than b, and neither of them wants to reveal the secret bounds. Will the deal take place? Our solution uses an oblivious third party T who learns no information about a or b, not even whether a b. The protocol needs only a single round of interaction, ensures fairness, and is not based on general circuit evaluation techniques. It uses a novel construction, which combines homomorphic encryption with the &phgr;-hiding assumption and which may be of independent interest. Applications include bargaining between two parties and secure and efficient auctions in the absence of a fully trusted auction service.Keywords
This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
- Secure ComputationPublished by Springer Nature ,2001
- Computationally Private Information Retrieval with Polylogarithmic CommunicationPublished by Springer Nature ,1999
- A new public key cryptosystem based on higher residuesPublished by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,1998
- Optimistic protocols for fair exchangePublished by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,1997
- Fair exchange with a semi-trusted third party (extended abstract)Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,1997
- The design and implementation of a secure auction serviceIEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 1996
- Secure circuit evaluationJournal of Cryptology, 1990
- Multiparty unconditionally secure protocolsPublished by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,1988
- How to play ANY mental gamePublished by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) ,1987
- Probabilistic encryptionJournal of Computer and System Sciences, 1984