Repricing executive stock opition in a down market
- 30 November 1994
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 18 (3) , 325-356
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(94)90025-6
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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