Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
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- 1 May 2007
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 97 (3) , 828-851
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.3.828
Abstract
Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types. (JEL C78, I12)Keywords
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