Dynamic games in organization theory
Open Access
- 1 July 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 16 (1-2) , 217-260
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(91)90049-4
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
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