The Child as a Philosopher of Values: Development of a Distinct Perception of Values in Childhood
- 1 October 1988
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Moral Education
- Vol. 17 (3) , 172-182
- https://doi.org/10.1080/0305724880170302
Abstract
This study suggests a distinct concept of value as a reason for action, and examines its validity and development in children aged 6‐7, 9‐10, and 12‐13. In the distinct meaning suggested here, value refers to perception of a behaviour as intrinsically (non‐contingently) desirable yet not strictly obligatory. Values are thus distinguished from morality, conventions and personal preferences by the dimensions of (1) intrinsic versus contingent validity and (2) obligatory versus non‐obligatory nature. The study reveals that many 6‐ to 7‐year‐old children already demonstrate a distinct concept of value, as defined here, and that this distinction develops with age. Subjects also distinguished between values and other reasons for action in terms of the most frequent type of reasons they gave for their perceptions, i.e. short‐ and long‐term utility as opposed to the welfare of others or social norms. It is suggested that the child's concept of values is based on his or her perceptions of a child's development, entailing increasing control over the environment, and that these very perceptions affect the child's actual behaviour and development.Keywords
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