Presidential Nominations and Coalition Theory
- 1 April 1979
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Quarterly
- Vol. 7 (2) , 175-197
- https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x7900700205
Abstract
Contemporary literature postulates that the success of candidate nomination efforts is closely tied to the "rules of the game." Contrary to this view, the authors contend that important variables intercede between the rules and candidate nomination. These vari ables fall under the umbrella of coalition theory. As applied in the article, coalition theory suggests that a presidential nomination is achieved if several qualifying criteria are ad dressed and met. The successful candidate must have the support of his home state delegation, a strong regional base, and continuous momentum. With respect to the 1976 nominating events, the authors conclude that coalition theory helps to explain success or failure in securing the presidential nomination. Moreover, the analysis indicates that both nominees would have triumphed under two alternate sets of nomination rules by following the strategy suggested by coalition theory. These findings have important implications for future contests.Keywords
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