Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard
- 1 October 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 82 (2) , 342-378
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2439
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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