Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard – on Debtors or Creditors?
- 1 January 2002
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 112 (476) , 107-132
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.0j675
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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