The Value of Investor Protection: Firm Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers
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- 29 January 2008
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 21 (2) , 605-648
- https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhm089
Abstract
International law prescribes that in a cross-border acquisition of 100% of the target shares, the target firm becomes a national of the country of the acquiror, and consequently subject to its corporate governance system. Therefore, cross-border mergers provide a natural experiment to analyze the effects of changes in corporate governance on firm value. We construct measures of the change in investor protection in a sample of 506 acquisitions from 39 countries. We find that the better the shareholder protection and accounting standards in the acquiror's country, the higher the merger premium in cross-border mergers relative to matching domestic acquisitions.Keywords
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