Centre parties and coalition cabinet formations: a game theoretic approach
- 29 May 1990
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 18 (3) , 325-348
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1990.tb00236.x
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 22 references indexed in Scilit:
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