Abstract
No rational person can deny the destructive potential of a nuclear bomb as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). The perception of anthrax as a WMD, however, is yet unformed in our society and its institutions. Opinions on anthrax WMD have ranged from dire to dismissive (1, 2), but a scientifically rigorous analysis of their destructive potential has been lacking. In a recent issue of PNAS, Wein, Craft, and Kaplan (3) filled this critical gap by providing quantitative assessment of the deaths resultant to a civilian population from an airborne attack of weaponized anthrax on a large city. The analysis in ref. 3 is a mathematical model, and, as such, is founded on scientific assumptions and framed in mathematical language. It is not a typical model of a scientific phenomenon, because of the irreducible uncertainty of its formulation and parameters. Its predictive power is thus subject to scientific debate. Nonetheless, this comprehensive model is the best information available to organize our understanding of anthrax as a WMD. Public misconceptions exist in the areas of treatment, prevention, detection, and destructiveness with regard to the character of anthrax. First of all, it is not the bacteria, Bacillus anthracis, that poses the greatest risk, but its dry concentrated spores. Inhaled spores, several microns in diameter, reach deep into the lungs, then travel to lymph nodes, replicate in the blood, and produce toxins that cause mortal illness (4). Medical intervention may be successful, but timing is critical. Postexposure oral antibiotic prophylaxis is efficacious if begun during the presymptomatic incubation stage. Combination antibiotics and aggressive hospital supportive care may also succeed in the prodromal stage, but the disease is beyond treatment and inevitably fatal once the fulminant stage is reached (5). Vaccination is believed effective, although complete immunity requires a series of six …

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