The political incentive explanation of “democratic peace”: Evidence from experimental research
- 1 February 1993
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 18 (3) , 215-229
- https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629308434805
Abstract
In this paper, we summarize a series of experimental studies that show that democracies don't fight each other because their leaders have very few political incentives to do so. The use of force against other democracies is perceived by the public and by leaders of democratic states as a failure of foreign policy. The reliance of democratic leaders on public support decreases therefore the likelihood of the use of force against other democracies.Keywords
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