Naive physics
- 1 January 1994
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 7 (2) , 227-247
- https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089408573121
Abstract
The project of a ‘naive physics’ has been the subject of attention in recent years above all in the artificial intelligence field, in connection with work on common‐sense reasoning, perceptual representation and robotics. The idea of a theory of the common‐sense world is however much older than this, having its roots not least in the work of phenomenologists and Gestalt psychologists such as Köhler, Husserl, Schapp and Gibson. This paper seeks to show how contemporary naive physicists can profit from a knowledge of these historical roots of their discipline, which are shown to imply above alla critique of the set‐theory‐based models of reality typically presupposed by contemporary work in common‐sense ontology [1].Keywords
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