Eighteen pairs of mentally retarded children were tested to determine their attitude toward objects. Each pair was composed of a brain-injured child and a non-brain-injured child (familial history) matched for mental age and I.Q. In the first expt., the children were asked to tell whether certain objects or events were "living" or " dead." Brain-injured children considered more inanimate objects as living than did the children of the familial type. The same was true for natural events (winds, clouds, moon, etc.). If it is true that children''s thinking follows a genetic sequence of stages from animistic to realistic attitudes, then brain-injured children place low on this developmental scale. Brain-injured children distinguished between living and dead more on the basis of use and human characteristics; the familial mental defectives discriminated more on the basis of spontaneous movement. There was greater variability in the answers given by brain-injured children so that the number of unique answers was higher in this group than in the familial group. In the 2d test, questions were asked concerning the capability of inanimate objects and natural events to "feel," "know," "be mean," etc. The results corroborated the first experiment. The brain-injured group gave a significantly greater number of responses attributing conscious activity to these objects. The authors have shown in other work that the brain-injured child is not lacking in an understanding of verbal concepts. These differences must be explained by other factors. The brain-injured child pays more attention to distractible stimuli than other children; he perseverates more; and he is lacking in willful, self-directed behavior. All of these things seem to make him less aware of the difference between spontaneous, personal activity, and external occurrences in the world of things.