Threats, communication, and bargaining.

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Abstract
Conducted an experiment with a total of 120 female university students and students' wives to examine the relationships between threat availability and bargaining under different conditions of communication opportunity in a Deutsch and Krauss-type bargaining game. It was anticipated that communication opportunities would form a context for the interpretation of threat, such that pairs with full communication would become competitive where threat was available, while those without communication opportunities would use threat as a signal for coordination, given the ambiguity of threat for them. Threat availability did facilitate coordination in the no-communication condition (p < .05) and interfered with coordination in the full-communication condition (p < .01). However, among those pairs with threat, having communication failed to affect coordination; among pairs without threat, having communication clearly facilitated coordination (p < .01). Results are discussed in terms of a possible dual function of communication, as a context for interpreting threat and as a tool for facilitating cooperation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

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