Intellectual Property: A Universal Human Right?

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Abstract
Given the ever-widening acceptance of a right to protection of intellectual property (IP), one might assume that there is at least implicitly an equally broad and agreed upon rationale or justification for this right. This, however, is not the case. Among those who write on the subject, there are two dominant, and not at all consistent, lines of reasoning. John Locke’s labor theory of property, one of the foundations of traditional property rights in the modern world, is a logical starting point for attempts to justify intellectual property rights (IPR), that is, the protection of exclusive ownership in intangible objects that acquire their value mainly from creative efforts.1 The second justification for IPR is derived from a traditional doctrine of [End Page 156] utilitarian inference, whereby the right to property is granted based on maximizing the benefits society can obtain.2 Although there are zones of overlap between these two lines of reasoning, even if they are taken together and their zones of disagreement ignored, they do not constitute an adequate or coherent prescriptive theory for the recognition of IP rights. Without a logical foundation for justifying IPR, their consideration as a basic human right seems untenable. Thus, this article presents an alternative argument for the justification of IPR and its manifestation as a human right.

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