Preventive action: Failure in Yugoslavia
- 1 December 1996
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Peacekeeping
- Vol. 3 (4) , 21-42
- https://doi.org/10.1080/13533319608413638
Abstract
Preventive action has been resurrected in the 1990s as a result of the horrors of civil wars, especially in Bosnia and Rwanda. Policy makers and academics have realized that political capital invested in preventive diplomacy can help to avoid or minimize the human and material costs of collective violence. On the other hand the experiences of the Yugoslavian crisis in 1989–92 show that the international community is not able to effectively prevent humanitarian crises. International organizations are too dependent on external constraints, including the interests of their leading members, and their division of labour is too primitive to permit an early and effective action. In addition, the relationships between the means and ends of preventive action are not often formulated in strategic terms. This not only leads to erroneous policies, but may even escalate rather than control violence.Keywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Dynamics of the Yugoslav CrisisSecurity Dialogue, 1995
- Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling 'Preventive Diplomacy'Foreign Affairs, 1995
- Underrating Preventive DiplomacyForeign Affairs, 1995
- Heading off War in the Southern BalkansForeign Affairs, 1995
- Conflict Prevention in EuropeCooperation and Conflict, 1994
- Is There a Democracy Gene?The Washington Quarterly, 1994
- Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of SerbiaInternational Security, 1994
- The U.N. and the Use of Force: Leave the Secretary General out of ItForeign Affairs, 1994
- An Agenda for PeaceInternational Relations, 1992
- Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political ScienceWorld Politics, 1991