The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions
- 1 January 2002
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 56 (4) , 693-723
- https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760403748
Abstract
The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions - Volume 56 Issue 4 - William Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, William Roberts ClarkKeywords
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