Optimal Debt and Equity Values in the Presence of Chapter 7 and Chapter 11
- 8 May 2007
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 62 (3) , 1341-1377
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01238.x
Abstract
Explicit presence of reorganization in addition to liquidation leads to conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. In the first–best outcome, reorganization adds value to both parties via higher debt capacity, lower credit spreads, and improved overall firm value. If control of the ex ante reorganization timing and the ex post decision to liquidate is given to borrowers, most of the benefits are appropriated by borrowers ex post. Lenders can restore the first–best outcome by seizing this control or by the ex post transfer of control rights. Reorganization is more likely and liquidation is less likely relative to the benchmark case with liquidation only.Keywords
This publication has 31 references indexed in Scilit:
- A Binomial Lattice Method for Pricing Corporate Debt and Modeling Chapter 11 ProceedingsJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2007
- On the Capital-Structure Implications of Bankruptcy CodesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2004
- Chapter 11, Private Workouts and Corporate Debt Pricing under Asymmetric InformationSSRN Electronic Journal, 2003
- Liquidation Triggers and the Valuation of Equity and DebtSSRN Electronic Journal, 2003
- Valuing Corporate Liabilities When the Default Threshold is not an Absorbing BarrierSSRN Electronic Journal, 2002
- How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became DistressedThe Journal of Finance, 1998
- A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder CongruenceThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994
- Financial Distress and Optimal Capital Structure AdjustmentsJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1993
- Option pricing: A simplified approachJournal of Financial Economics, 1979
- Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structureJournal of Financial Economics, 1976