Egoistic Rationality and Public Choice: A Critical Review of Theory and Evidence*
- 1 March 1987
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 63 (1) , 10-21
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.1987.tb00633.x
Abstract
Over the past 20 years there has been a rapid development of public‐choice theory: that is, the application of an assumption of egoistic utility maximization to political behaviour. In this paper it is argued that, in important areas, the available empirical evidence runs counter to this theory. The continuing work in this area therefore reflects ideological, rather than explanatory or predictive, concerns.Keywords
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