The Missile Crisis: His Finest Hour Now

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Abstract
The Cuban missile crisis has become something of a misleading “model” of the foreign policy process. There are seven central tenets of this model, each of which was considered “confirmed” by the “lessons” of the Cuban crisis: (1) Crises are typical of international relations; (2) Crises are assumed to be manageable; (3) The domestic sector is not especially critical in “crisis management”; (4) Crisis management is the practical ability to reconcile force with negotiation; (5) The process of crisis negotiation is not only manageable but can be “won”; (6) The Soviets seldom negotiate except under duress; (7) Crisis management can and must be a civilian enterprise. After the crisis, there were the beginnings of detente with the Soviet Union. The test-ban treaty, the hot line, and a more civil exchange between the two powers are widely believed to stem from die favorable resolution of the missile crisis. Yet the model and its inherent assumptions on the meaning of Cuba can be challenged. Nevertheless, Cuba stands as a watershed in the cold war and in the history of the international system.

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