Self Selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health Insurance

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  • 1 January 2001
    • preprint
      • Published in RePEc
Abstract
In Chile, dependant workers are mandated to purchase health insurance and they can chose between one public provider and several private providers. Here, we analyze the relation between utilization and the choice of either private or public insurance. Independent workers, however, are not mandated. In this case, we analyze the relationship between utilization and the decision to purchase insurance. The results show adverse selection against insurance companies for independent workers and against FONASA for dependant workers. Moral hazard is negligible in the case of hospitalization. Regarding medical visits, over consumption is quantitatively important and statistically significant in all cases (against insurance for independents; against public and private insurance in the case of dependant workers).
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