A reexamination of the principal-agent relationship in politics
- 1 January 1994
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 53 (1) , 149-163
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(94)90018-3
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- THE INFLUENCE OF IDEOLOGY ON CONGRESSIONAL VOTINGEconomic Inquiry, 1991
- The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political InstitutionsThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1990
- Do legislators' votes reflect constituency preference? A simple way to evaluate the SenatePublic Choice, 1989
- Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politiciansPublic Choice, 1989
- The Rationality of IdeologyThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1989
- A test for pure or apparent ideology in congressional votingPublic Choice, 1989
- Political cheatingPublic Choice, 1987
- IDEOLOGY AND LEGISLATOR SHIRKINGEconomic Inquiry, 1987
- A Method of Estimating the Personal Ideology of Political RepresentativesAmerican Political Science Review, 1984
- Stability in CompetitionThe Economic Journal, 1929