Official bailouts, moral hazard and the ‘speciality’ of the international interbank market
- 30 June 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Emerging Markets Review
- Vol. 4 (2) , 165-196
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s1566-0141(03)00026-8
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
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