A game theory perspective on interference avoidance
- 22 February 2005
- proceedings article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Vol. 1, 257-261
- https://doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2004.1377950
Abstract
We show that the fixed power, synchronous Interference Avoidance (IA) scheme of (3) employing the (greedy) eigen-iteration can be modeled as the recently developed potential game of (10). Motivated by the fact that receivers can make small mistakes, we consider the convergence of the eigen- iteration when noise is added in a manner similar to (2). Further, we restrict ourselves to a class of signal environments that we call levelable environments. Applying game-theory, we obtain a convergence result similar to that of (2) for levelable environments: arbitrarily small noise assures that the eigen- iteration almost surely converges to a neighborhood of the optimum signature set.Keywords
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