Are There Rival, Incommensurable Theories?
- 1 June 1979
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 46 (2) , 244-262
- https://doi.org/10.1086/288864
Abstract
Following an account of the incommensurability argument, an objection, based on assumptions concerning rival theories, is examined and rejected. This rejection leads to an alternative direction of criticism of incommensurability, a direction that involves the articulation of comparative standards of theory evaluation that are independent of meaning invariance.Keywords
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