FOMC VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ELECTORAL CYCLES: PARTISAN IDEOLOGY AND PARTISAN LOYALTY
- 1 March 1996
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 8 (1) , 17-32
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1996.tb00118.x
Abstract
The influence of partisan and electoral considerations on the monetary policy voting behavior of Federal Reserve Governors is investigated in the context of a model permitting the estimation of reaction functions on the basis of FOMC voting records. The results suggest that once we have controlled for the state of the economy and for the prevailing stance of monetary policy, both partisan ideologies and partisan loyalties appear to play an important role in the Governors’voting calculus.Keywords
This publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
- Determinants of inflationary performance: Corporatist structures vs. central bank autonomyPublic Choice, 1993
- Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of AppointmentThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993
- Reliable and unreliable partisan appointees to the Board of GovernorsPublic Choice, 1992
- SCREENING FOMC MEMBERS FOR THEIR BIASES AND DEPENDABILITYEconomics & Politics, 1991
- THE FED AND THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLEContemporary Economic Policy, 1991
- A theory of FOMC dissent voting with evidence from the time seriesPublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1990
- Economic Performance, Voting, and Political Support: A Unified ApproachThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 1990
- Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting VotesJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1989
- On the Existence of a Political Monetary CycleAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1989
- Monetary Policy Signaling from the Administration to the Federal ReserveJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1988