Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market
- 1 March 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 25 (3-4) , 561-592
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(00)00036-1
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
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