Central bank independence and public debt policy
- 1 May 1997
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 21 (4-5) , 873-894
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(97)00003-1
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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