Web of Interests and Patterns of Behaviour of Chinese Local Economic Bureaucracies and Enterprises during Reforms

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Abstract
One of the central concerns in a study of the political economy of reforms in China is to determine the factors that affect the pace and the direction of reforms and to see if the objectives of the reformers can be obtained within a realistic time period. In the current literature on the political economy of reforms, much attention has been focused upon the orientation, decisions and interests of the Chinese top and regional leadership and central economic bureaucracies. For example, Harry Harding, in his recent book, has written extensively about the debates that took place between the moderate and radical reformers within the Chinese leadership on the two contrasting approaches to speeding up economic growth. On local governments and economic bureaucracies, much attention is paid to the conflicts of interest between the centre and the locality, and between different bureaucracies. Christine Wong has argued that with the substantial gain in allocation power, local governments are able to behave in ways detrimental to central objectives. Dorothy Solinger and Susan Shirk have described different ministerial responses to inflation control measures and reform initiatives.