Violent crime and punishment: an application of the LISREL model
- 1 August 1995
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 27 (8) , 719-725
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00036849500000061
Abstract
Public anxiety over violent crime has forged a broad consensus to purchase more crime control. Recently, the President brought into law a federal anti-crime bill that will put an additional 100 000 police on the nation's streets. This paper presents empirical evidence on the deterrence effect of police presence. The principal finding is that police presence deters commission of violent crimes by increasing the risk of being punished for committing those crimes. This risk is modelled as a latent variable, because the probability and severity of punishment for committing a violent crime are generally communicated in an inconsistent fashion. The violent crime commission rate is also treated as a latent variable, because it is almost certainly afflicted with measurement error.This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
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