Agency costs in banking firms: An analysis of expense preference behavior
- 31 May 1985
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economics and Business
- Vol. 37 (2) , 103-112
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0148-6195(85)90010-4
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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