Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
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- 11 December 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier
- Vol. 13 (3) , 171-195
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y
Abstract
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