Free Association and the Theory of Proportional Representation
- 1 March 1984
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 78 (1) , 31-43
- https://doi.org/10.2307/1961247
Abstract
Several of the earliest advocates of proportional representation upheld the “principle of free association”: that electors should be free to choose the constituencies to which they belong. This article analyzes this principle in game-theoretic terms and investigates how far the free association “game” can be simulated through proportional representation. It is assumed that each voter's prime concern is that his most-preferred candidate should be elected. If preferences are single peaked, the outcome of an election based on free association can be predicted; the same outcome would result from a modified form of the single transferable vote.Keywords
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