Referential/Attributive
- 1 October 1975
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 7 (1) , 91-101
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1977.10716179
Abstract
Donnellan has introduced a distinction between two uses of referring terms, the referential and the attributive. A referentially used term is said to pick out that object the speaker has in mind, the one he meant or intended to refer to, while a term used attributively is said to pick out whichever object it names or denotes. While it is generally agreed that Donnellan has discovered a real difference in the way referring terms work, it has by no means been dear how the distinction could or should be handled theoretically. That has two consequences. First, intuitions diverge over difficult or marginal cases and, with no theory to appeal to, the taxonomic part of the enterprise is threatened. Second, the referential/attributive distinction has not become an accepted, relatively uncontroversial tool for solving problems about the semantics of utterances; and this is a least partly because of a lack of theory. But the distinction, so one feels, really is more important than it has thus far shown itself to be.Keywords
This publication has 2 references indexed in Scilit:
- Putting Humpty Dumpty Together AgainThe Philosophical Review, 1968
- Reference and Definite DescriptionsThe Philosophical Review, 1966