Dollarization, Bailouts, and the Stability of the Banking System
- 1 May 2002
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 117 (2) , 467-502
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753650300
Abstract
Central bank policy suffers from time inconsistency when facing a banking crisis: a bailout is optimal ex post, but ex ante it should be limited to cKeywords
All Related Versions
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