Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers
- 1 May 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 44 (4-6) , 667-681
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(00)00057-x
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraintsEconomics Letters, 1996
- Incentives in TeamsEconometrica, 1973
- Multipart pricing of public goodsPublic Choice, 1971
- Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed TendersThe Journal of Finance, 1961