Negotiating Strategic Arms Control, 1969-1979
- 1 September 1984
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 28 (3) , 535-559
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002784028003008
Abstract
In a replication of earlier disarmament studies, a positive correlation of .49 (p < .01) was found between United States and Soviet concessions during the 23 rounds of the Strategic Arms Limitation talks covering the period 1969-79. It was also found that the United States tended to make concessions earlier in the negotiations than the Soviet Union. Such a strategy might not have been the wisest, for some evidence was produced suggesting that the Soviet Union has reacted in a conciliatory fashion to a hard-line U.S. position in the previous round as measured by the imbalance in concession scores. But since reciprocity remains important to success, rigidly holding a hard-line position may delay agreement. In the case of SALT, such delays worked against U.S. strategic interests.Keywords
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