Efficient Manipulation in a Repeated Setting
- 4 February 2004
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 42 (1) , 31-49
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2004.00128.x
Abstract
We analyze the optimal behavior of an organization when its employees can manipulate the organization's accounting system to their private advantage. We find that the organization may benefit by helping its employees manipulate the system. This help can reduce the employees' private returns from devoting effort to further manipulation of the accounting system, which reduces the cost of motivating the employees to devote their effort to improving the real (rather than the measured) performance of the organization.Keywords
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