Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic formats?
- 1 June 2007
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 38 (2) , 355-372
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00072.x
Abstract
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This publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
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