Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes
- 1 March 1989
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 10 (2) , 121-134
- https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250100203
Abstract
A model of the determinants of chief executive (CEO) compensation is presented and tested. Based on a sample from the leisure industry, the study finds that CEO pay has complex links to several factors: firm size, complexity, performance, CEO power, board vigilance, and the CEO's human capital. The study includes a separate examination of CEO salary and bonus, as well as a test of pay determination across McEachern's (1975) ownership categories.Keywords
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