Learning from the Market as A Motive for Disclosure: The Case of Takeover Announcement Timing
Preprint
- 1 January 2003
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper investigates why some firms disclose their takeover plans after they have signed definitive merger agreements, but others do so prior to such agreemeKeywords
This publication has 49 references indexed in Scilit:
- Managerial compensation and the threat of takeoverJournal of Financial Economics, 1998
- Relative valuation roles of equity book value and net income as a function of financial healthJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1998
- Bustup Takeovers of Value‐Destroying Diversified FirmsThe Journal of Finance, 1996
- Can Takeover Losses Explain Spin-Off Gains?Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1995
- Diversification's effect on firm valueJournal of Financial Economics, 1995
- Executive Careers and Compensation Surrounding Takeover BidsThe Journal of Finance, 1994
- How Target Shareholders Benefit from Value‐Reducing Defensive Strategies in TakeoversThe Journal of Finance, 1990
- Tender Offer Auctions, Resistance Strategies, and Social WelfareJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1989
- Merger bids, uncertainty, and stockholder returnsJournal of Financial Economics, 1983
- Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate MergersThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1981