How to Regulate Heterogeneous Hospistals

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  • 1 January 2003
    • preprint
      • Published in RePEc
Abstract
Ways to regulate French public hospitals? The purpose of this paper is to study hospital costs in the event of introduction of a Prospective Payment System in France. We use a nested three dimensional database (stays-hospitals-years) in order to identify hospital unobservable heterogeneity and a transitory moral hazard component of cost variability. Econometric estimate are performed on a sample of 7,314 stays for acute myocardial infarction observed in 36 French public hospitals over the period 1994 to 1997. Transitory moral hazard is far from negligible : its estimated standard error is about 50 % of the standard error we estimate for cost variability due to permanent unobervable heterogeneity between hospitals. Simulations show that a cost reduction of about 16 % can be expected from implmentation of a payment system which allows for permanent unobserved heterogeneity and eliminates only transitory moral hazard. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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