Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial
- 1 June 1986
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 39 (1) , 226-232
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90026-8
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- Conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot gamesInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 1985
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterionJournal of Economic Theory, 1979
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1975
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for SupergamesThe Review of Economic Studies, 1971
- Reaction Functions and the Theory of DuopolyThe Review of Economic Studies, 1968